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''FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co.'' (the ''MPAS'' case)〔(''FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co.'' ), 344 U.S. 392 (1953), reversing 194 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1952), affirming 47 F.T.C. 378 (1950.〕 was a 1953 decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that, where exclusive output contracts used by one company "and the three other major companies have foreclosed to competitors 75 percent of all available outlets for this business throughout the United States" the practice is "a device which has sewed up a market so tightly for the benefit of a few (it ) falls within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act, and is therefore an 'unfair method of competition' " under § 5 of the FTC Act.〔344 U.S. at 395.〕 In so ruling, the Court extended the analysis under § 3 of the Clayton Act of requirements contracts that it made in the Standard Stations case to output contracts brought under the Sherman or FTC Acts.〔See Friedrich Kessler and Richard H. Stern, (''Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration'' ), 69 L.J. 1, 59-60 (1959), which argues that the ''MPAS'' and ''Standard Stations'' cases indicate a coalescence between the standards of unlawfulness under the Sherman and Clayton Acts and for forward and backward (downstream and upstream) integration by contractual exclusive dealing arrangements.〕 ==Background== The FTC brought an administrative proceeding against MPAS, asserting that its extensive exclusive dealing arrangements (of duration of from one to five years) with motion picture theaters foreclosed others from dealing with those theaters, and was therefore an unfair method of competition in violation of § 5 of the FTC Act. (The FTC could not have brought the case under § 3 of the Clayton Act, as the ''Standard Stations'' case had been brought, because of the narrow and specific language of the Clayton Act.〔First, sale of theater advertising time involves a service, not a commodity, to restrictive sales of which § 3 of the Clayton Act is limited. Second, there was no sale on condition that the buyer (here, MPAS) was not to deal in the goods of other sellers, as required for violations of § 3; rather, there was a purchase on a condition of not selling to others. Kessler, 69 L.J. at 53.〕) MPAS's business is to enter into contracts with sellers of goods and services to produce short advertising motion picture films (so-called trailer ads) which depict and describe commodities offered for sale by these companies and then screen the films in the theaters with which it has contracts. (MPAS pays the theaters to make their customers watch the advertisements.〔A dissenting FTC Commissioner said that "the privilege of boring the public for pay is a theatre owner's inalienable right, provided he doesn't carry the thing too far." See ''Motion Picture Advertising Service Co. v. FTC'', 194 F.2d 633, 635 (5th Cir. 1952).〕) MPAS and three other companies in the same business (against which the FTC also brought proceedings〔The FTC sued and entered similar orders against the other three companies. See ''Matter of Reid H. Ray Film Industries'', 47 F.T.C. 326 (1950); ''Matter of Alexander Film Co.'', 47 F.T.C. 345 (1950); ''Matter of United Film Ad Service, Inc.'', 47 F.T.C. 362 (1950). See also 344 U.S. at 394.〕) together had exclusive arrangements for advertising films with approximately three-fourths of the total number of theaters in the United States which display advertising films for compensation.〔344 U.S. at 393.〕 The FTC found that MPAS's exclusive contracts limited the outlets for films of competitors and forced some competitors out of business because of their inability to obtain outlets for their advertising films. The FTC then entered a cease and desist order prohibiting MPAS from entering into or continuing in effect any such contract that grants an exclusive privilege for more than a year.〔344 U.S. at 394. The FTC found that an exclusive contract of a year or less "is not an undue restraint upon competition." ''Id''. n.2.〕 MPAS appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the FTC's order. It said that "we . . . have decided the case on its merits" and held that the challenged practice "was not unfair or unreasonable, but was rendered desirable and necessary by good-business acumen and ordinarily prudent management."〔''Motion Picture Advertising Service Co. v. FTC'', 194 F.2d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 1952).〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co.」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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